Management forecasts are an important source of information for the Japanese stock market. In this paper, we use management forecast error as a proxy for disclosure quality to investigate the relationship between disclosure quality and idiosyncratic risk.We find that management forecast error is positively related to idiosyncratic risk, suggesting that high-quality public information reduces idiosyncratic risk. Furthermore, we present evidence that management forecast error is less positively related to idiosyncratic risk in relatively good information environments.
Introduction
Studies (e.g., Campbell et al. 2001; Morch et al. 2000) have identified an increase in the level of average stock return volatility. This paper uses management forecast error as a proxy for disclosure quality to investigate the relationship between disclosure quality and idiosyncratic risk. Japan's stock exchanges ask firms to forecast the following year's key accounting figures. Although not all firms are required to provide these forecasts, most listed firms do.
1 Ota (2010) suggests that management forecasts have higher correlation with and incremental explanatory power for stock prices than realized income , indicating that management forecasts represent an important information source for Japanese stock markets.
This study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, we investigate the relationship between the quality of disclosed information and firm risk. Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2011) argue that good information reduces firm risk: the higher the quality of accruals, as proposed by Dechow and Dichev (2002) , the lower a firm's idiosyncratic risk. Okuda and Kitagawa (2011) investigate the relationship between five earnings quality measures (e.g., accruals quality, earnings predictability, and earnings smoothness) and idiosyncratic risk during a period of accounting standard reform in Japan. They find that the higher a firm's quality of earnings, the lower its idiosyncratic risk, which is consistent with the findings of Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2011) with stock return synchronicity because firms with high synchronicity have less idiosyncratic information in their stock price. Datta et al. (2013) show that the relationship between financial statement opacity and idiosyncratic risk is not found if they use the performance-matched discretionary accruals developed by Kothari et al. (2005) and the two-way clustered standard error proposed by Petersen (2009) . Therefore, the effect of financial information transparency on idiosyncratic risk remains as an empirical question.
Unlike these studies, we consider management forecast accuracy as a proxy for the quality of the disclosed information and examine the relationship between management forecast error and idiosyncratic risk. Muramiya (2005) finds that firms with lower management earnings forecast accuracy have a higher cost of capital than do firms with higher management earnings forecast accuracy. Ota (2011) suggests that Japanese analysts are at least somewhat aware of the factors related to systematic bias in management earnings forecasts. Therefore, management forecast error that is unexpected by investors should have a larger impact on idiosyncratic risk. Using well-known determinants of management forecast bias, we decompose management forecasts into expected components, which are explained by forecast biases, and unexpected components.
Furthermore, we examine the relationship between management forecasts and idiosyncratic risks after controlling for the determinants of management forecasts. Studies (e.g., Gotoh, 1997; Iwasaki et al., 2012; Kato et al., 2009; Ota, 2006) have found that managers' initial earnings forecasts for a fiscal year are systematically upward biased, and they have analyzed the determinants of that management forecast bias. Asano (2007) finds that firms manage their forecasts as well as their earnings. In order to control the determinants of management forecasts, we regress management forecasts and regard the absolute value of residuals as management forecast error. We show that our measures have more explanatory power than do plain management forecast error.
Second, we examine how the effects of management forecast error differ according to the quality of the information environment. Botosan (1997) finds that for firms in a poor information environment, greater disclosure is associated with a lower cost of capital. Aman (2011) finds an interactive effect between forecast credibility and media coverage of earnings performance. This study uses firm size and analyst following as proxies for a firm's information environment.
Our analyses indicate that management forecast error is positively related to idiosyncratic risk, suggesting that high-quality disclosed information reduces idiosyncratic risk, which is consistent with Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2011) . We further show that management forecast errors are less positively related to idiosyncratic risks for larger firms and firms with analyst following, suggesting that management forecast accuracy is less important for firms with good information environments.
The rest of this study proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the hypothesis development; in Section 3, we discuss the research design; in Section 4, we describe the sample selection and descriptive statistics; and in Section 5, we present the results. The final section concludes the study and suggests future research possibilities.
Hypothesis development
Theoretical support for a negative association between disclosure level and idiosyncratic risk is found not only in the accounting literature but also in the financial literature. For example, Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) show that improving disclosure reduces stock market volatility. Easley and O'Hara (2004) employ a model indicating that a firm's disclosure policy can influence its idiosyncratic risk.
In response to these studies, Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2011) use the quality of earnings as a proxy for the quality of disclosed information and find that it is negatively associated with lower idiosyncratic risk. Okuda and Kitagawa (2011) also show that the higher a Japanese firm's quality of earnings, the lower its idiosyncratic risk.
In addition to financial reporting, management forecasts are also a major channel of disclosed information. The Tokyo Stock Exchange and other Japanese stock exchanges ask that firms forecast the following year's key accounting figures. Although not all firms are forced to provide their forecasts, virtually all listed firms do. Management forecasts have thus attracted both practical and academic attention. Ota (2010) suggests that management forecasts have the highest correlation with and incremental explanatory power for stock prices.
These arguments lead to our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis I: Management forecast errors are positively correlated with idiosyncratic risks.
Next, we turn to the interaction between the information environment and disclosed information. Botosan (1997) finds that the association between the cost of equity capital and disclosure levels is less significant for firms that attract a greater number of analysts.
Moreover, Aman (2011) finds an interactive effect between forecast credibility and media coverage of earnings performance, suggesting that the information environment affects the impact of management forecasts on the stock market. Thus, we develop hypothesis II, which predicts that management forecast errors are less positively correlated with idiosyncratic return volatility when firms face a better information environment.
To examine hypothesis II, we adopt two common proxies for information environment.
The first measure is firm size. Research suggests that size proxies for the amount of prior information available about a firm (e.g., Atiase, 1985; Bhushan, 1989; Collins et al., 1987; Freeman, 1987; Grant, 1980) . For example, Atiase (1985) and Freeman (1987) have shown that the relationship between management forecast accuracy and stock returns is weak in large firms. We thus assume that larger firms have a better information environment.
The second measure is analyst following. Because analysts play a significant role as intermediaries between firms and external parties, analyst following is commonly considered as a proxy for the quality of the information environment (Atiase et al., 1988; Bhushan, 1989; Collins et al., 1987; Freeman, 1987; Lobo & Mahmoud, 1989; O'Brien & Bhushan, 1990) . More recently, Frankel and Li (2004) find that increased analyst following is associated with reduced profitability of insider trades and reduced insider purchases. We thus assume that information environment gets better when one or more analysts actively track and publish opinions on the firms. Using these two proxies, 2 we examine testable hypotheses IIa and IIb. 
Research design

Idiosyncratic risk
First, we describe the procedure for measuring the two main variables, idiosyncratic risk and management forecast error. Although some related literature (e.g., Foerster et al., 2010 ) uses the market model, we use the three-factor model in Fama and French (1993) to measure idiosyncratic return volatility. This measure is the same as that of Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2011) . More specifically, we measure excess returns as the residual from a regression of equation (1):
and Bushman (1989) suggest that the number of analysts following a firm is positively related to the firm's market value.
where RET i, m corresponds to the daily stock return for firm i in month m, R f, m is the risk-free rate in month m, 3 and (R M, m -R f, m ) is the value-weighted excess market returns in month m. 4 SMB m is the size factor spread portfolio in month m, and HML m is the book-to-price ratio factor spread portfolio in month m.
We estimate equation (1) for each year using daily data covering from July 1 at year t to June 30 at year t + 1. We define the idiosyncratic return volatility (RMSE) as the sample standard deviation of the excess returns. 
Residual management forecast error
As previously mentioned, our study examines the association between management forecast accuracy and idiosyncratic risk. Thus, we first calculate the total management forecast error variable, defined as a sum of the sales forecast error, ordinary income (i.e., earnings before extraordinary items, special items, and taxes) forecast error, and net income forecast error. These forecast errors are defined as initial management forecasts of sales for year t minus actual sales for year t divided by total assets for year t − 1, and divided by each error's standard deviation in order to match the units. 3 We define the risk-free rate as the government bond yield over ten years. 4 We define the market return as the rate of change in the Tokyo Stock Price Index (TOPIX). 5 Our measures for idiosyncratic risk are different from those of Aman (2011) in some regards. First, Aman (2011) uses a return generation model in which the daily return for each firm is explained by the daily market portfolio (the rate of change in the TOPIX) and the industry average return, whereas we use the three-factor model in Fama and French (1993) . Second, Aman (2011) calculates the idiosyncratic risk as one minus R-squared in the return generation model and as log-transformed. In contrast, we calculate idiosyncratic risk as the standard deviation of the residual in the three-factor model. 6 We also used another standardized management forecast error. First, the mean value was subtracted from each management forecast error by year, and then the difference between the management forecast error and the mean was divided by the standard deviation. However, our conclusions did not change.
However, management forecasts are biased; several studies have identified the determinants of management forecast error (Iwasaki et al., 2012; Kato et al., 2009; Rogers & Stocken, 2005) . For example, Ota (2006 Ota ( , 2011 shows that financial distress, firm growth, firm size, and prior forecast errors are associated with bias in Japanese management
forecasts. In addition, Ota (2011) suggests that Japanese analysts are at least somewhat aware of the factors related to systematic bias in management earnings forecasts. If investors are aware of these systematic management forecast errors, the idiosyncratic risk for the following year should be more strongly correlated with the unsystematic portion of management forecast errors (i.e., those forecast errors not explicable by the factors related to systematic management forecast bias). Therefore, we first determine the unsystematic portion of management forecast errors and then investigate its relationship with idiosyncratic risk. We calculate the residual value by estimating equation (2) below and using it as a proxy for unsystematic management forecast errors (hereafter referred to as "residual management forecast errors"). We include some determinant factors of management forecast accuracy as independent variables. In this regard, we mainly follow Ota (2006 Ota ( , 2011 , which investigates the determinants of management forecast bias in Japanese listed firms. First, we include the management forecast error for the previous year (MFE t−1 ), as studies have shown evidence of the persistence of management forecast error (e.g., Gong et al., 2009; Ota, 2006 Ota, , 2011 .
It is possible that our results could be explained by the endogenous relation that firms with higher idiosyncratic risk have earnings that are more difficult to predict. In order to cope with this possibility, we include simultaneous idiosyncratic risk (RMSE). Considering that managers tend to release optimistic forecasts (e.g., Kato et al., 2009), we expect RMSE to be positively related to management forecast errors. Several studies have found that forecast behavior is associated with firm size (e.g., Baginski & Hassell, 1997; Bamber & Cheon, 1998; Choi & Ziebart, 2004) . After hypothesizing that large firms are likely to issue conservative earnings forecasts because they regard management forecasts as commitments to stakeholders, Ota (2006) finds a negative relationship between firm size and management forecast errors. Following these studies, we include firm size (SIZE), calculated as the natural log of the market value at the end of year t.
Ota (2006) shows that firms issue prudential forecasts before seeking external financing. Therefore, we include a capital increase dummy (CI) that takes one if firms increase their contributed capital and zero otherwise.
The literature shows that managers of distressed firms are more likely to issue optimistic earnings forecasts than are the managers of other firms (e.g., Frost, 1997; Ota, 2006; Rogers & Stocken, 2005) . Thus, we include the current ratio (CRATIO) and financial leverage (LEV) as independent variables. Because firms suffering losses are likely to disclose optimistic forecasts (e.g., Ota, 2006), we include a loss firm dummy (LOSS) as an independent variable.
We also include sales growth (GROWTH) as an independent variable. High-growth firms experience a relatively large negative stock price response to negative earnings surprises (e.g., Skinner & Sloan, 2002) and are, therefore, more likely to engage in earnings guidance to meet their expectations at the earnings announcement date (e.g., Choi & Ziebart, 2004; Matsumoto, 2002; Ota, 2006; Richardson et al., 2004; ) . We expect GROWTH to be negatively related to MFE.
Finding that firms whose management dividend forecasts increase over current dividends have a negative management forecast error, Ota (2006) posits that increased dividend forecasts contain information about strong future firm performance beyond that provided by management earnings forecasts. Therefore, we include an increased dividend forecast dummy (DIV) with a value of one if a firm increases its management dividend forecasts over current dividends and zero otherwise. Last, we include year dummies (YD) to control year effects. Detailed definitions of the variables in estimation model (3) are provided in Appendix A.
We estimate equation (2) Each variable is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles by year. We then calculate the residual from equation (1). The absolute value of the residual corresponds to the unsystematic portion of management forecast error (ARMFE). We use the absolute value because both highly optimistic and pessimistic management forecasts can be interpreted as firm-specific risks for investors. To check the robustness of our results, we apply the same procedure to three specific management forecasts (i.e., sales forecasts, ordinary income forecasts, and net income forecasts) and calculate the absolute value of the residual forecast error (ARMFE_SLS, ARMFE_OI, and ARMFE_NI).
8 Table 2 provides the estimation results of the residual management forecast error determined using the dynamic panel data model. Coefficients on management forecast 7 We describe the sample selection criteria in more detail in Table 3 . 8 We did not include operating income forecasts in our analysis due to data availability constraints. In 2007, the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) began to require listed firms to provide operating income forecasts because of their growing importance for investors. Therefore, no pre-2007 data were available. errors for year t − 1 (MFE t−1 , MFE_SLS t−1 , MFE_OI t−1 , and MFE_NI t−1 ) are significantly positive, suggesting that management forecast errors have serial correlations. In addition, coefficients on the loss dummy (LOSS) are significantly positive, and coefficients on the firm size (SIZE), sales growth (GROWTH), and change in dividends dummy (DIV) are significantly negative, which is consistent with prior studies.
(Insert Table 2 about here)
The relationship between residual management forecast error and idiosyncratic risk
To test hypothesis I on the relationship between management forecast error and ex-post idiosyncratic risk, we estimate equation (3) as follows:
The dependent variable is RMSE t , which is defined as idiosyncratic return volatility based on the three-factor model in Fama and French (1993) for fiscal year t.
In independent variables, the test variable is the measure of the residual management forecast error (ARMFE), as described in Section 3.2. If hypothesis I is supported, the coefficient of ARMFE will be positive. To check the robustness of our result, we test the relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and three specific management forecast errors as well as the total management forecast error (ARMFE). Specifically, we examine the relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and the absolute value of the residual management forecast error for (1) sales (ARMFE_SLS), (2) ordinary income (ARMFE_OI), and (3) net income (ARMFE_NI). 9 We also predict that the coefficients of ARMFE_SLS, ARMFE_OI, and ARMFE_NI will be significantly positive.
We control for several variables affecting return volatility in the cross-section. Firm size (SIZE) is expected to negatively relate to idiosyncratic volatility because small firms experience higher return volatility (e.g., Pastor & Veronesi, 2003; Rajgopal & Venkatachalam, 2011) . We define SIZE as the natural log of total assets. We control for firm profitability, which is posited to relate negatively to return volatility (e.g., Wei & Zhang, 2006) . Thus, we use net income divided by total assets (ROA) and the loss dummy (LOSS) as control variables. In addition, as high-growth firms experience higher stock return volatility (e.g., Cao et al., 2006; Malkiel & Xu, 2003; Rajgopal & Venkatachalam, 2011), we use the rate of sales changes as a proxy for firm growth. Because distressed firms experience greater stock return volatility (e.g., Campbell et al., 2001; Rajgopal & Venkatachalam, 2011) , we include the variables controlling financial distress, defined as financial leverage (LEV) and measured by total liabilities divided by total assets.
In addition, the literature indicates that ownership structure influences idiosyncratic volatility. For example, Brockman and Yan (2009) show that blockholders increase idiosyncratic volatility because of their informational advantage. Sias (1996) and Malkiel and Xu (2003) report that institutional ownership has a positive impact on future volatility.
10 Ferreira and Matos (2008) show that high foreign institutional ownership is associated with high firm-level idiosyncratic variance because foreign investors prefer to invest in high-risk firms.
To control for the effect of ownership structure, this study includes the following three At last, we include year dummies (YD) to control year effects. Appendix B provides detailed definitions of the variables in model (3).
The effect of the information environment on the relationship between residual management forecast errors and idiosyncratic risk
To test hypothesis IIa on the effect of firm size on the relationship between residual management forecast errors and idiosyncratic risk, we estimate equation (4) below: where SIZEq1 is an indicator variable set to one if the level of total assets is in the first quartile, where that quartile contains the firms with the lowest total assets in each year, and zero otherwise. SIZEq4 is an indicator variable set to one if the level of total assets is in the fourth quartile, where that quartile contains the firms with the highest total assets in each year, and zero otherwise. Other variables are defined earlier.
To test hypothesis IIa, we include the interaction term between ARMFE and the dummy variables based on the quartile of total assets in equation (4). The first (fourth) quartile of firm size, SIZEq1 (SIZEq4), indicates the poor (good) information environment.
We expect the coefficient of ARMFE × SIZEq4 to be negative (and the coefficient of ARMFE × SIZEq1 to be positive), consistent with hypothesis IIa.
We estimate equation (5) to examine hypothesis IIb on the effect of analyst coverage on the relationship between residual management forecast errors and idiosyncratic risk.
To test hypothesis IIb, we include the interaction term between ARMFE and the dummy variables based on the analyst coverage (COV) in equation (5). COV is an indicator variable set to one if one or more analysts actively track and publish opinions on a company and its stock, and zero otherwise. If COV is equal to one, it indicates a good information environment. We expect the coefficient of ARMFE × COV to be negative, consistent with hypothesis IIb.
Sample and descriptive statistics
Sample selection
The sample is selected based on the following criteria:
(1) The firms are listed on Japanese stock exchanges from 2000 to 2008.
(2) The firms' fiscal year ends in March. Details on the sample selection criteria are provided in Table 3 . The final sample comprises 7,457 firm-year observations.
(Insert Table 3 about here) 11 The industries of the sample firms are identified using the Nikkei medium industry classification code (Nikkei gyousyu chu-bunrui). Table 4 Table 5 about here) Table 6 shows the results of the multivariate regressions of model (3). The table shows that ARMFE is significantly positive at below 0.1 levels, as expected. We also find that the coefficients of the components of ARMFE, ARMFE_SLS, and ARMFE_NI are significantly positive. These results indicate that less accurate management forecasts increase idiosyncratic return volatility, supporting hypothesis I. However, the coefficient on ARMFE_OI is insignificant, which is not consistent with hypothesis I. The overall results provide weak evidence on the management forecasts' accuracy and the idiosyncratic return volatility.
Descriptive statistics
Main results
The results of testing hypothesis I
The table also shows that almost all control variables have their expected signs and are statistically significant at conventional levels, except for ROA, GROWTH, and CROSS.
Institutional ownership, a distinctive ownership structure in Japan, has a negative effect on idiosyncratic risk. In addition, the coefficient on foreign ownership becomes significantly positive.
(Insert Table 6 about here) Table 7 presents the results of the estimation of equation (4) On the other hand, the coefficients on ARMFE × SIZEq4, ARMFE_SLS × SIZEq4, ARMFE_OI × SIZEq4, and ARMFE_SLS × SIZEq4, which are our main concerns, are significantly negative at less than 0.01 levels. These results imply that the accuracy of larger firms' management forecasts has a less significant impact on idiosyncratic risk, which is consistent with hypothesis IIa.
The results of testing hypothesis II
(Insert Table 7 about here) Table 8 reports the results of the estimation of equation (5) Table 7 . The coefficients on ARMFE, ARMFE_SLS, ARMFE_OI, and ARMFE_NI are larger and t-values tend to be larger than those of equation (3), suggesting that management forecast accuracy is more important for firms with no analyst following. In addition, the coefficients on ARMFE × COV, ARMFE_SLS × COV, ARMFE_OI × COV, and ARMFE_NI × COV are all significantly negative. This suggests that firms with one or more analysts actively tracking and publishing opinions on them show a lower correlation between idiosyncratic risk and the absolute value of residual management forecast errors, which is consistent with hypothesis IIb.
(Insert Table 8 about here) Thus, our results support hypotheses IIa and IIb: in firms with a good information environment, management forecast accuracy is less important to the evaluation of firms' specific risk.
Conclusion
This paper has considered management forecast error as a proxy for disclosure quality and has investigated the relationship between disclosure quality and idiosyncratic risk. Our analyses show that management forecast error is positively related with idiosyncratic risk, indicating that high-quality public information reduces that risk. Furthermore, our evidence demonstrates that management forecast error is less positively related with idiosyncratic risk in firms with the highest total assets and firms with one or more analysts actively tracking and publishing opinions on them. This indicates that management forecast error is less positively related with idiosyncratic risk in relatively good information environments.
Appendix A Definitions of variables in estimation model (2)
Variables Measurement
Comp1 from principal component analysis of three variables regarding management forecast errors: (1) management forecast error of sales, (2) management forecast error of ordinary income, and (3) management forecast error of net income. 
MFE_SLS
Appendix B Definitions of variables in estimation model (3)
Variables Measurement RMSE t Idiosyncratic return volatility based on the three-factor model in Fama and French (1993) for fiscal year t.
Absolute value of the residual management forecast errors for year t − 1. Management forecast error is defined as Comp1 from principal component analysis of three variables regarding management forecast errors: (1) management forecast error of sales, (2) management forecast error of ordinary income, and (3) management forecast error of net income. Residual management forecast errors are defined as the residual of estimation model (2).
ARMFE_SLS t−1
Absolute value of the residual management forecast errors for sales for year t − 1. Residual management forecast errors are defined as the residual of estimation model (2).
Absolute value of the residual management forecast errors for ordinary income for year t − 1. Residual management forecast errors are defined as the residual of estimation model (2).
Absolute value of the residual management forecast errors for net income for year t − 1. Residual management forecast errors are defined as the residual of estimation model (2).
Natural log of total assets at the end of year t. ROA t−1
Return on assets for fiscal year t − 1.
Sales growth for fiscal year t − 1.
LOSS t−1
Indicator variable with a value of one if the firm reports a net loss and zero otherwise.
Total liabilities divided by total assets at the end of fiscal year t − 1.
The percentage of institutional ownership at the end of fiscal year t − 1.
The percentage of cross-shareholdings at the end of fiscal year t − 1.
The percentage of foreign ownership at the end of fiscal year t − 1.
Figure 1 Residual management forecast error by year
Panel A: Mean value of absolute value of residual management forecast error Panel B: Median value of absolute value of residual management forecast error Figure 1 shows mean and median absolute value of residual management forecast error by year. The definitions of each variable are as follows. ARMFE = absolute value of residual management forecast error for sum of the sales, ordinary income, and net income. ARMFE_SLS = absolute value of residual management forecast error for sales. ARMFE_OI = absolute value of residual management forecast error for ordinary income. ARMFE_NI = absolute value of residual management forecast error for net income. Each variable is Winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles by year. Table 2 reports the estimation results of the residual management forecast error found using the dynamic panel data model. The definitions of each variable are as follows. MFE t = management forecast error, which is defined as Comp1 from principal component analysis of three variables regarding management forecast errors. MFE_SLS t = management forecast error of sales (= [initial management forecasts of sales for year t minus actual sales for year t] / total assets for year t − 1). The management forecast error for sales for year t is divided by the standard deviation of the error for year t. MFE_OI t = management forecast error of ordinary income (= [initial management forecasts of ordinary income for year t minus the actual ordinary income for year t] / total assets for year t − 1). The management forecast error of ordinary income for year t is divided by the standard deviation of the error for year t. MFE_NI t = management forecast error of net income (= [initial management forecasts of net income for year t minus the actual net income for year t] / total assets for year t − 1). The management forecast error of net income for year t is divided by the standard deviation of the error for year t. RMSE t = idiosyncratic return volatility based on the three-factor model in Fama and French (1993) for fiscal year t. SIZE t = natural log of total assets at the end of year t. CINC t = indicator variable with a value of one if the firm increases its contributed capital and zero otherwise. CRATIO t = current assets divided by current liabilities at the end of year t. LEV t = total liabilities divided by total assets at the end of year t. LOSS t = indicator variable with a value of one if the firm reports a net loss and zero otherwise. GROWTH t = sales growth at the end of year t. DIV t = indicator variable with a value of one if the firm increases its management dividend forecasts over the current dividends and zero otherwise. All sequential variables are Winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles by year. The t-values are calculated by the robust estimation of the fixed-effects panel data models, and ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed t-test. (2) Less: Missing other data for estimation of models (3), (4), and (5) Final sample 24,566 (7,584) (441) (1,029) (7,384) (116) (515) 8,527
Table 3 Sample selection criteria
(1,070) 7,457 Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in this study. The definitions of each variable are as follows. RMSE = idiosyncratic return volatility based on the three-factor model in Fama and French (1993) for fiscal year t. ARMFE = absolute value of the residual management forecast errors for year t − 1. Management forecast errors are defined as Comp1 from principal component analysis of three variables regarding management forecast errors. ARMFE_SLS = absolute value of residual management forecast error for sales for year t − 1. ARMFE_OI = absolute value of residual management forecast error for ordinary income for year t − 1. ARMFE_NI = absolute value of residual management forecast error for net income for year t − 1. SIZE = natural log of total assets at the end of fiscal year t − 1. ROA = return on assets for fiscal year t − 1. GROWTH = sales growth for fiscal year t − 1. LOSS = indicator variable with a value of one if the firm reports a net loss and zero otherwise. LEV = total liabilities divided by total assets. INST = the percentage of institutional ownership at the end of fiscal year t − 1. CROSS = the percentage of cross-shareholdings at the end of fiscal year t − 1. 
( 1 Table 5 presents the correlation matrix for the variables used in the main analysis, with Pearson (Spearman) correlations below (above) the diagonal. The definitions of each variable are as follows. RMSE = idiosyncratic return volatility based on the three-factor model in Fama and French (1993) for fiscal year t. ARMFE = absolute value of the residual management forecast errors for year t − 1. Management forecast errors are defined as Comp1 from principal component analysis of three variables regarding management forecast errors. ARMFE_SLS = absolute value of residual management forecast error for sales for year t − 1. ARMFE_OI = absolute value of residual management forecast error for ordinary income for year t − 1. ARMFE_NI = absolute value of residual management forecast error for net income for year t − 1. SIZE = natural log of total assets at the end of fiscal year t − 1. ROA = return on assets for fiscal year t − 1. GROWTH = sales growth for fiscal year t − 1. LOSS = indicator variable with a value of one if the firm reports a net loss and zero otherwise. LEV = total liabilities divided by total assets. INST = the percentage of institutional ownership at the end of fiscal year t − 1. CROSS = the percentage of cross-shareholdings at the end of fiscal year t − 1. FOREIGN = the percentage of foreign ownership at the end of fiscal year t − 1. All sequential variables are Winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles by year, and ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels using a two-tailed t-test. Table 6 shows the results of the multivariate regressions of model (3). The table presents the relationship between the absolute value of residual management forecast error and idiosyncratic risk. The definitions of each variable are as follows. RMSE = idiosyncratic return volatility based on the three-factor model in Fama and French (1993) for fiscal year t. ARMFE = absolute value of the residual management forecast errors for year t − 1. Management forecast errors are defined as Comp1 from principal component analysis of three variables regarding management forecast errors. ARMFE_SLS = absolute value of residual management forecast error for sales for year t − 1. ARMFE_OI = absolute value of residual management forecast error for ordinary income for year t − 1. ARMFE_NI = absolute value of residual management forecast error for net income for year t − 1. SIZE = natural log of total assets at the end of fiscal year t − 1. ROA = return on assets for fiscal year t − 1. GROWTH = sales growth for fiscal year t − 1. LOSS = indicator variable with a value of one if the firm reports a net loss and zero otherwise. LEV = total liabilities divided by total assets. INST = the percentage of institutional ownership at the end of fiscal year t − 1. CROSS = the percentage of cross-shareholdings at the end of fiscal year t − 1. FOREIGN = the percentage of foreign ownership at the end of fiscal year t − 1. All sequential variables are Winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles by year. In the panel, t-values are corrected for heteroskedasticity as well as for cross-sectional and time-series correlation using a two-way cluster at the firm and year levels, as proposed by Petersen (2009); ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed t-test. Table 7 presents the results of the estimation of equation (4) in testing hypothesis IIa. The table presents the effect of firm size on the relationship between the absolute value of residual management forecast error and idiosyncratic risk. The definitions of each variable are as follows. RMSE = idiosyncratic return volatility based on the three-factor model in Fama and French (1993) for fiscal year t. ARMFE = absolute value of the residual management forecast errors for year t − 1. Management forecast errors are defined as Comp1 from principal component analysis of three variables regarding management forecast errors. ARMFE_SLS = absolute value of residual management forecast error for sales for year t − 1. ARMFE_OI = absolute value of residual management forecast error for ordinary income for year t − 1. ARMFE_NI = absolute value of residual management forecast error for net income for year t − 1. SIZEq1 = indicator variable set to one if the level of total assets is in the first quartile, where that quartile contains the firms with the lowest total assets in each year, and zero otherwise. SIZEq4 = indicator variable set to one if the level of total assets is in the fourth quartile, where that quartile contains the firms with the highest total assets in each year, and zero otherwise. ROA = return on assets for fiscal year t − 1. GROWTH = sales growth for fiscal year t − 1. LOSS = indicator variable with a value of one if the firm reports a net loss and zero otherwise. LEV = total liabilities divided by total assets. INST = the percentage of institutional ownership at the end of fiscal year t − 1. CROSS = the percentage of cross-shareholdings at the end of fiscal year t − 1. FOREIGN = the percentage of foreign ownership at the end of fiscal year t − 1. All sequential variables are Winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles by year. In the panel, t-values are corrected for heteroskedasticity as well as for cross-sectional and time-series correlation using a two-way cluster at the firm and year levels, as proposed by Petersen (2009); ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed t-test. Table 8 presents the results of the estimation of equation (4) in testing hypothesis IIa. The table presents the effect of analyst following on the relationship between the absolute value of residual management forecast error and idiosyncratic risk. The definitions of each variable are as follows. RMSE = idiosyncratic return volatility based on the three-factor model in Fama and French (1993) for fiscal year t. ARMFE = absolute value of the residual management forecast errors for year t − 1. Management forecast errors are defined as Comp1 from principal component analysis of three variables regarding management forecast errors. ARMFE_SLS = absolute value of residual management forecast error for sales for year t − 1. ARMFE_OI = absolute value of residual management forecast error for ordinary income for year t − 1. ARMFE_NI = absolute value of residual management forecast error for net income for year t − 1. COV = indicator variable set to one if one or more analysts actively track and publish opinions on a company and its stock, and zero otherwise. SIZE = natural log of total assets at the end of fiscal year t − 1. ROA = return on assets for fiscal year t − 1. GROWTH = sales growth for fiscal year t − 1. LOSS = indicator variable with a value of one if the firm reports a net loss and zero otherwise. LEV = total liabilities divided by total assets. INST = the percentage of institutional ownership at the end of fiscal year t − 1. CROSS = the percentage of cross-shareholdings at the end of fiscal year t − 1. FOREIGN = the percentage of foreign ownership at the end of fiscal year t − 1. All sequential variables are Winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles by year. In the panel, t-values are corrected for heteroskedasticity as well as for cross-sectional and time-series correlation using a two-way cluster at the firm and year levels, as proposed by Petersen (2009); ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed t-test.
